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Public perception of the threat to public safety resulting from the existence in the 
community of “ dangerous” , “ violent”  or “ high risk”  persons appears to be 
increasing. This is evidenced by the media attention given to incidents of harm 
resulting from the behaviour of such persons and the involvement of various special 
interest groups with the issue. “ Official”  responses range from the promotion and 
support of community education programs to procedural reforms for application by 
social control agents, including the implementation of “ risk assessment”  strategies 
and legislative reforms, the most recent in Canada being Bill C-55.1
While the current preoccupation of the media, citizen groups and various 
government agencies with the identification and control of dangerous persons appears 
to signal an unusual or “ growing” problem, this is not a new issue. In fact, it could 
be argued that this problem has always been at the centre of the debate concerning 
the balance between individual and collective rights in democratic societies.
This issue has taken on a particular twist recently with the focus on the release 
of “ violent offenders”  into the community. Various adjustments have been made to 
the assessment and release programs of the federal and provincial corrections and 
conditional release systems in an attempt to label such persons and provide increased 
administrative controls over them. The designation of persons as dangerous or high 
risk offenders, the detention of such persons for indeterminate periods and the attempt 
to improve cross-jurisdictional communications about such persons are examples 
which immediately come to mind. As well, law enforcement agencies have struggled 
with the “ demand” being placed on them by citizens’ groups to provide public 
notice of the release or relocation into their community of persons designated as 
violent or high risk. A particular focus is placed on sex offenders.
A number of questions emerge from this situation. In Canadian society, what is 
the relationship between the public’s need to know and the individual’s right to 
privacy? Under what circumstances can it be said that the completion of a sentence 
resulting from a conviction for an offense as defined in law is not sufficient 
recompense to society and further penalties imposed by the state directly or indirectly
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are justified? Is the state ever justified in releasing from its control persons known 
to be unable to control their behaviour, thereby risking harm to others? Is the 
sanctioning power o f the state, when exercised by its agencies (police, courts, 
corrections, etc.), properly used to prevent future behaviour, or is it only legitimized 
by the proven existence of sanctionable behaviour? What is the public’s right to an 
assurance of safety and security? How far can the citizenry go in attempts to protect 
itself from possible harm resulting from the behaviour of specific individuals?
Background to the Problem
In one sense, this problem is illustrative of the desire to organize human affairs into 
categories of good and evil. Defining and constraining the “ bad” has been 
fundamental to both secular philosophy and religious dogma. It is what law is about 
and what many social institutions exist to address.
Some social institutions have been given the task o f defining the “ good” and 
others have been made responsible for the education and development of individual 
personalities in keeping with those definitions. Generally, the government has been 
given the task of identifying the “ bad”  and providing the means to isolate and 
neutralize it. In many ways, “ dangerousness”  is perceived by both citizens and 
social control agents as a confrontation between the good and bad in the absence of 
effective institutional constraints. For example, what is to be done with dangerous 
persons after they have “ served their time” and are no longer required to submit to 
confinement or supervision?
Related to this is the problem of de-institutionalization, especially as practised by 
the mental health agencies of government. Integration of persons suffering from 
various mental disorders into the community has become a preferred strategy in many 
jurisdictions. The concern is that this results in the release or placement into the 
community of persons who are dysfunctional or “ dangerous” . Some of these 
persons commit criminal offenses, are confined in correctional settings to complete 
their sentence, and then are released into the community, allegedly more dangerous 
than before confinement.2
This issue is also reflective of the public’s general concern about the credibility 
of the agencies charged with the administration of justice. The effectiveness and 
integrity of police, the ability of the “ adversarial process”  to protect the interests of
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citizens, the apparent disparities in the sentencing patterns of the courts, the 
effectiveness of correctional programs and the intelligence of the conditional release 
process have all come into serious question in recent years. The average citizen is 
now likely to expect that decisions made in the justice system will increase the threat 
to public safety, not reduce it. Thus we find the call for apparently extraordinary 
measures to “ pick up the slack” where the agencies of the justice system have failed 
or no longer have jurisdiction.
The Problem
The problem of how to assure the highest possible order of public safety while 
providing reasonable guarantees of individual liberties can be organized into levels 
of concern moving from the philosophical to the pragmatic.
At the philosophical level, the problem can be defined in terms of the difficulty 
of deciding what constitutes freedom and responsibility within a democracy. What 
is owing to the individual and to the collective with regard to those concepts? If 
freedom is attendant on some measure of corresponding capacity to exercise 
responsibility, then how are we to respond to those who are evidently unable or 
unwilling to exercise responsibility in their public affairs? Is it justifiable for the 
collective to limit the freedom of other persons based on their apparent lack of 
capacity to exercise responsibility even if they have not been convicted of any 
offense in law or, having been convicted, have satisfied the penalty as prescribed by 
law?
At the pragmatic level, the problem has both political and professional 
dimensions. Government, by definition, has a mandate and a duty to provide for the 
safety of the citizens within its jurisdiction. Governments may succeed or fail based, 
to a large extent, on the degree to which the citizens perceive themselves to be secure 
in the mundane aspects of their daily lives. This responsibility translates into a 
political need to provide assurances that matters of safety and security have priority 
in public policy and public expenditures. In the political sense, the assurance of 
public safety may be a more important and consuming issue than guarantees of 
private freedom. This tension is well known to legislators and agents of government 
responsible for social control.
From the perspective of those professional agencies responsible for keeping the 
peace, defending the accused, confining the convicted or treating personality 
disorders, the problem translates into demands for procedural clarity. Confusion with 
regard to the exercise of professional discretion in assuring a satisfactory balance 
between public safety and individual liberty often results in tragedy or, at the very 
least, public dissatisfaction.
Jurisdictional Impediments to Resolution
In the public mind, tragic events resulting from a deliberate act by a person who is 
or has been placed within the jurisdiction of social control agents (e.g. “ has a 
record” , is on parole, was recently released from an institution, etc.) are evidence of 
a failure by the social control system to carry out its responsibilities. Such 
“ breakdowns”  often result in public inquiries. In recent years, public inquiries into 
welfare, child-care, law enforcement and correctional systems have been occurring 
in Canada on an almost continuous basis.3
All of these inquiries, to one degree or another, focus on the dichotomy between 
public safety and private rights. In almost all cases, the findings demonstrate “ gaps” 
in the ability of social control agents to assure public safety either because their 
responsibilities are not clearly delineated or because they do not or cannot 
successfully interface with other social control agencies. As persons move from the 
jurisdiction of one agency to another (police to courts, courts to corrections, 
corrections to parole, etc.), problems of information transfer or commitments to 
differing priorities may result in loss of contact or attention to the “ client” . 
Sometimes the client is an offender or threatening person who needs structure and 
supervision, and sometimes the client is a specific individual citizen placed at risk 
because of the existence of such persons.
In democratic societies, coercive systems of social control usually are required 
to “ show cause” before they can act coercively towards a person. Interventions of 
the state which are arbitrary or exploratory to the inconvenience or detriment of the 
individual are usually disallowed and, if discovered, are themselves subject to 
sanctioning. A common complaint of police agencies in Canada is that the show 
cause rules are sufficiently stringent to thwart investigations and hinder successful 
prosecutions. Tempering the ability of social control agents to act arbitrarily is a 
responsibility of the state in protecting the interests of the individual citizen.
As a general rule, showing cause must be based on reasonable probabilities that 
an offense has been committed or that a threat to commit an offense exists. Evidence 
in support of the probability is necessary. However, a constraint is placed on the 
state agent when a proposed intervention is based wholly on a prediction of future 
behaviour. This is the case especially when the individual is not already subject to a 
court order or convicted of an offense and the prediction is based on an assessment 
of the personality (tendency toward violence, abuse, etc.).
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The hesitation to take action based on predictions of future behaviour is built into 
the principles of social control for several reasons. One has to do with the lack of 
confidence in the human capacity to make reasonably accurate predictions about 
future events, especially involving the behaviour of human beings. It is likely that 
the state agency in Canada which has worked hardest to identify means of predicting 
future behaviour is the federal corrections system. Various kinds of risk assessment 
tests and strategies have been introduced over the years. The obvious reason for this 
is the public and professional concern about releasing into the community persons 
who have been convicted of a crime and institutionalized as a result. While various 
devices for assessing risk seem to represent an improvement over guessing, the 
primary finding has been that some strategies work better for predicting behaviour 
under controlled circumstances than others. No method to date, however, has 
generated significant confidence in the reliability of predictions when an individual 
is exercising free will within the general population.4
Interestingly, while there is a general lack of confidence in the predictive power 
of current behavioral assessment techniques, there remains a continuing adherence to 
the belief in the ability of human beings to change their behaviour. This is combined 
with a strong commitment to various rehabilitation and reintegration strategies as 
applied to both criminal offenders and persons suffering mental or emotional 
disorders with or without attendant criminality. The general rule is that “ we don’t 
give up on people” . Coupled with that is the view that human beings deserve the 
opportunity, on completion of a sentence or as an aspect of treatment, to demonstrate 
that they are able to function as responsible citizens without being continually faced 
with condemnation for their past mistakes.
Another reason for resisting action based on predictions of future behaviour is 
ideological. It has to do with the idea that personal freedom is essential to our 
understanding of a functional democracy. Any type of action on the part of the state 
which diminishes personal freedom is suspect. The idea that the state may guess 
what a person is going to do and act to prevent it (no matter how educated the guess) 
is generally considered abhorrent to the spirit of justice. The potential for abuse, 
given the considerable power resting with the decision-maker, is obvious. Ironically, 
it might be predicted that persons or agencies holding such power are likely to abuse 
it. There is a considerable literature which addresses this problem in studies of law 
enforcement, mental health, correctional systems and the professions of psychology 
and psychiatry.5
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Finally, it is difficult to develop procedures which allow an agent or agency to 
act on predictions o f future behaviour because of the lack of support for such 
practices in Canadian law. The state cannot criminally sanction a citizen without 
proof that a prohibited act occurred in which the citizen was deliberately involved. 
In Canadian law, the state may not punish or delimit the freedom of someone who 
may commit an offense. Since 1982, the Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms has 
solidified this principle.6
It must be acknowledged that the law makes provision for detaining persons for 
assessment in order to determine whether or not they are capable of exercising free 
will without threat to themselves or the community. In addition, the law currently 
provides that offenders convicted of certain serious offenses may be denied statutory 
release and detained until the end of their sentences. The provisions of Bill C-55 
would enhance the capacity of the justice system to provide controls for persons 
found to be dangerous offenders, especially sex offenders. The conditions under 
which these various provisions apply are limited and somewhat clouded by the lack 
of trust in the general ability of the state to exercise such power responsibly. There 
is a worry that such measures may become Draconian.7 These procedures and 
proposals remain the focus of considerable debate.
Principles for Resolving the Issue
So what does this have to do with the original issue, namely, the perceived need to 
increase public safety through the identification and control of persons who are 
deemed violent or dangerous?
It means that, given the principles of philosophy and law at work in the Canadian 
experience, this issue can only be legitimately addressed through sanctions applied on
6Part I o f  the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.
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the basis of past, proven behaviour. It is possible, as Bill C-55 proposes, to expand 
sanctions for certain kinds of offenses on the grounds that it is a legitimate purpose 
of punishment to intervene with convicted citizens in a manner which is intended to 
prevent further similar offenses being committed by themselves or others. In this 
writer’s opinion, proposals such as found in Bill C-55 act to legitimize crime 
prevention as a purpose of punishment.
However, having done that, can sanctioning based on the principle of crime 
prevention continue at the completion of the sentence? Given that the original 
offense was considered serious enough to provide for expansive or extraordinary 
sanctioning, do citizens have a right to conclude that the offender is to be continually 
punished for past behaviour through extraordinary measures such as the publishing 
of public information about the offender on release including the nature of the 
offense, their residence address and their picture?
The rehabilitation and reintegration into the community of persons whose 
personal and social circumstances have resulted in deviancy or offensiveness is very 
difficult. Research makes clear that the placement of persons in coercive settings, 
either for punishment or treatment, creates the danger of generating additional 
difficulties for them on release. The process of adjustment back into the community 
requires as supportive an atmosphere as possible. It would be interesting to know the 
number of persons who have recidivated because of the community’s response to 
knowledge of their previous crimes. Anecdotal evidence from offenders would 
suggest that, at the very least, their ability to find employment or gain acceptance to 
training and education programs was lessened or nullified by such knowledge, 
forcing, in their view, a return to criminal behaviour. This is such a well-accepted 
belief about the fate of inmates on release that it has become a common theme in 
books, plays and movies.
Therefore, it could be argued that the publication of information about an 
offender on release increases the threat to public safety rather than reducing it. This 
would appear to be a reasonable assumption whether or not a position is taken in 
favour of the possibility that an offender can be rehabilitated. It is arguable that in 
addressing this problem, it might be helpful to rank the values that are most 
consistently reflected in the expressed desires and expectations of individual citizens. 
Various authorities have attempted to “ model”  the way in which persons do this.8
Regardless of differences in politics or culture, it would appear that the general 
ordering of priorities in response to threats is as follows: first, that personal safety is 
assured (this desire may be transferred to another, such as a child); second, that 
personal rights be guaranteed to the highest degree possible (that is, that the personal
8See e.g. B. Hall, Value Clarification as a Learning Process (New York: Paulist Press, 1972) and J.M. 
Pollock, Ethics in Crime and Justice (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1994).
liberty of the threatened person not be impeded); and finally, that the rights of others, 
including the threatening person, be guaranteed to the highest degree possible. It 
appears clear that, if the first priority is not guaranteed in any particular situation, 
then the lesser priorities may be sacrificed. Persons may be willing to give up 
considerable personal freedom to recover safety and to deny the right to others 
altogether.
This is, in the opinion of this writer, what the debate is all about. When is the 
threat to personal safety so great that persons are individually or collectively willing 
to sacrifice their freedom and the freedom of others? It must be conceded that it is 
not possible to deny freedom to others without denying freedom to yourself. If we 
support practices which result in an inability of others to live their lives freely, then 
we have created the conditions for such practices to be applied to ourselves. More 
significantly, an environment has been created which enhances suspicion and distrust 
to which all persons are subjected, offenders or not. It is possible to describe 
circumstances where such decisions have had to be made. Sometimes people act on 
each other in ways that require responses which place everyone under restrictions. 
These responses are almost invariably made to improve conditions of personal safety. 
Wars and natural disasters, as well as criminal events, provide sufficient illustrations.
Two factors are important in responding to this dilemma within law-based 
democratic societies. The first is that the response should be within the law when 
acting on values and the second is that the law should not extend itself so far as to 
distort those values.
With regard to the problem of the high risk or dangerous offender, it seems 
evident that the criminal justice and mental health systems must continue to increase 
the resources available for identification and treatment. Persons who have committed 
serious harm and whose behaviour is repetitive should be placed under severe 
restrictions while under sentence and under careful monitoring if released.
Given that, the price of attempting to remove all potential threat or risk is simply 
too high. In part, this is because the view of what constitutes risk may vary and 
because decisions about what behaviours are so threatening as to require delimiting 
freedoms within the community may be made on the basis of political concessions 
to the most vocal or influential pressure groups. As well, the temptation to enhance 
the ability of the members of the community to act coercively on others through law 
or policy creates serious problems of accountability. The coercive power of the state, 
however exercised, should be limited. Persons who are able to interfere with the 
lives of others should be subject to review themselves. In our culture and legal 
system, there is a difference between revenge carried out by the citizen and 
retribution carried out by the state. Some of the possible responses to the perceived 
threat of a dangerous offender returning to the community foster an atmosphere of
revenge which, among other things, threatens personal safety — the first priority of 
persons facing a high risk situation.
There is no doubt that the offensiveness of some persons is extreme and that the 
maladies they suffer may be deeply entrenched. Some of the proposed responses, 
such as those found in Bill C-55, may assist in improving conditions of safety for 
some members of the community. These should be carefully reviewed. However, 
some responses, such as publicly releasing information about persons at the 
completion of their sentences, have the clear potential to backfire, resulting in 
increasing conditions of threat both with regard to personal safety and personal 
liberty.
Finally, as with so many emotionally-charged community problems, it is very 
important that the law be clear and consistent in its reinforcement of fundamental 
social values. In practical terms, the legislative process is the means by which the 
balance between personal safety and personal liberty gets addressed. Statute law and 
regulations which result from this process ought not to distort this balance for short­
term political ends or for any other reason. Formal review of current initiatives to 
satisfy the public interest in personal safety guarantees will no doubt take place in the 
framework of the Canadian Charter o f  Rights and Freedoms. As this issue gets 
addressed in Charter cases, it will be interesting to see what limitations on rights and 
freedoms are considered by the courts to be justifiable in a free and democratic 
society, especially when citizens perceive themselves to be under significant personal 
threat.
